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Van Fraassen (2008) argues that data provide the target-end structures 
required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models 
represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees, but argues that there 
is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to 
accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data 
extracted from it. In this paper I reconstruct his argument and show that it 
turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of 




Models are important units of science and one of their primary roles is to represent 
phenomena. This much is uncontroversial. How they do so, and not unrelatedly, how 
they do so accurately, isn’t. One popular suggestion is to take models to be 
mathematical structures, and appeal to a morphism between models and their target 
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  systems as constituting, at least in part, the representation relation between the two.2 
An alternative suggestion is to focus on accurate representation, and appeal to such 
morphisms as establishing this instead. But target systems are physical phenomena, 
and thus are not straightforwardly the kind of things that can enter into morphisms.3 
So the structuralist of either stripe is required to provide an account of where the 
target-end structures come from.  
 
One suggestion is data models supply them. But as van Fraassen (2008) notes, 
scientific models ultimately represent, and by implication, accurately or inaccurately 
represent, phenomena, not data. His response is to argue that, for a particular 
individual, in a given context, there is no pragmatic difference between accurately 
representing the two. When using data to locate a target system in the logical space of 
a scientific model, a model user cannot doubt that the model accurately represents the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There are different ways of cashing out the formal details of this suggestion. Some 
take mathematical structures to be set-theoretic (Suppes 1960). Others prefer state-
spaces (van Fraassen 1980) or partial structures (French and Ladyman 1999, Bueno 
and French 2011). The particular morphism appealed to also varies. Isomorphism 
(Suppes 1960), homomorphisms (Mundy 1986), partial isomophisms or 
homomorphisms (accompanying partial structures), and isomorphic embeddings (van 
Fraassen 1980, 2008) have all been suggested. The terminology used throughout this 
paper is set-theoretic but the same points could be made in other languages (i.e. 
category theory). I use ‘morphism’ to remain neutral between the invoked structure 
preserving mappings. 
3 Throughout this paper I use the terms ‘target systems’ and ‘target phenomena’ 
interchangeably, with no suggestion that as ‘systems’ they are thereby structured.   
	  target whilst granting that it accurately represents the data on pain of a pragmatic 
contradiction. This contradiction is akin to Moore’s paradox, stated in terms of 
representation rather than assertion. But the argument requires that the act of using a 
data model to locate the target system in logical space induces certain pragmatic 
commitments. I will argue that this is false, so the argument is unsound. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 I distinguish between two 
different structuralist claims. Model-target morphisms may be invoked to establish 
that models represent their targets, or that they represent them accurately. I consider 
whether data supply the target-end structures required by either claim. I point out that 
since data and phenomena are distinct, this poses a problem for the structuralist. In 
Section 3 I reconstruct van Fraassen’s solution: pragmatically, in a given context, for 
a particular individual, there is no difference between accurately representing the two. 
This reconstruction requires significant clarification regarding where van Fraassen’s 
argument concerns representation simpliciter and where it concerns accurate 
representation. In Section 4 I make explicit how the argument requires that acts of 
representation induce pragmatic commitments and demonstrate this is false. I consider 
and rebut possible responses to my concerns and argue that van Fraassen’s apparent 
focus on providing an account of how models represent accurately pre-judges the 
more fundamental question: how do they represent in the first place? 
 
2. Representation, accurate representation, and data 
 
The distinction between accurate representation and representation simpliciter has 
been explicit in the literature since at least Suárez (2003). Models can misrepresent 
	  their targets, by attributing to them features they don’t have, but still represent them. 
The history of science provides numerous examples. Despite the efforts to carefully 
distinguish between philosophical accounts of scientific representation and accurate 
representation, the temptation to blur the two remains, especially in discussions of the 
structuralist position. Critics have typically taken structuralists to be committed to the 
claim that model-phenomena morphisms constitute, at least in part, representational 
relationships (Suárez 2003; Frigg 2006). But others have interpreted structuralists as 
claiming that they play a role in establishing representational accuracy (Contessa 
2011).4 Furthermore, it’s plausible that they are supposed help address both notions. 
Muller (2011) suggests choosing tailor made morphisms on a case-by-case basis, 
where a weaker morphism establishes the representational relationship and a stronger 
one establishes representational accuracy. Similar suggestions have been made by 
advocates of the partial isomorphism approach (Bueno and French 2011). Van 
Fraassen’s argument for the pragmatic equivalence between taking a model to 
accurately represent phenomena and data is explicitly couched in terms that concern 
accuracy (or in line with his constructive empiricism, accurate representation of 
observable phenomena): ‘empirical adequacy’, ‘fit’, ‘match’, and so on. But as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Even once the role played by morphisms is fixed, the extent of that role is 
contentious. Some attempt to reduce representation to model-target morphisms 
(French 2003, albeit with caveats). Others, including van Fraassen, are happy to adopt 
a non-reductive strategy and additionally appeal to the intentions of model users. 
Throughout this paper I use the term ‘structuralist’ to refer to any account that takes a 
model-target morphism to be at least a necessary condition on either representation or 
accurate representation. 	  
	  discussed below, his argument makes use of both types of representational 
relationship, and clarifying what he is concerned with, and where, is an important, and 
often non-trivial, task.  
 
All structuralists are faced with the problem that morphisms, by definition, only hold 
between mathematical objects. And many target systems, animal populations, 
celestial bodies, and so on, are not structures, at least in any obvious way. Set-
theoretic structures are abstract, mathematical, entities. Targets are physical. So the 
onus is on the structuralist to provide an account of where to find the structure at the 
target-end of the morphism. One suggestion is that targets instantiate structures in the 
sense that individuals in a system can be collected into a domain and the physical 
relations in the system provide extensional relations defined over it. I do not discuss 
this suggestion here, beyond noting that van Fraassen himself describes it as the 
‘“dormative virtue” response [which is not] only … merely verbal, but … also hijacks 
a term from mathematics for unwarranted use elsewhere’ (2010, 549).  
 
An alternative is to appeal to data models as supplying the requisite target-end 
structures. This approach originated in Suppes (1962), and is found in van Fraassen’s 
earlier work, but van Fraassen (2008) provides the most fully developed account of 
the role of data in the structuralist tradition, and as such is my primary interest here.5 	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In the following sections, all references given only with page numbers refer to 
Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (2008). Formatting in quotations 
is from the original unless indicated otherwise. 
	  What are data models? Experimental measuring processes gather raw data. These are 
then cleaned (with anomalous datum rejected and measurement error taken into 
account) and usually idealized, e.g. discrete data points may be replaced by a 
continuous function. Often, although not always, the result is a smooth curve through 
the data points that satisfies certain theoretical desiderata.6 These resulting data 
models can be treated as set-theoretic structures. Assuming that the data points are 
numeric, the smooth curve is a function that can be treated as a relation defined over 
ℝ, or ℝn, or intervals thereof.7	  
 
Thus, if data models are invoked as supplying target-end structures then the 
structuralist can conclude that a scientific model represents, or accurately represents, a 
data model only if the two are appropriately morphic. But the following points should 
make us suspicious whether this suffices as an account of scientific representation:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Harris (2003); van Fraassen (2008, 166-68), for further elaboration on this 
process. Van Fraassen’s discussion throws up a terminological issue that needs 
regimenting to avoid confusion. Throughout this paper I use ‘data model’ rather than 
van Fraassen’s ‘surface model’ to refer to the end result of the cleaning and idealizing 
process. I also use ‘scientific model’ in place of van Fraassen’s ‘theoretical model’.  
7 The example of numerical data is illustrative. As van Fraassen notes, the process of 
creating data models is not restricted to ‘number assigning’, and the resulting 
structures do not have to have ℝ as their domain. For example, a measurement 
procedure may only provide an ordinal ranking, and therefore deliver a different kind 
of structure (pp.158-60). This has no bearing on the discussion below. 
	  1. Phenomena ≠ Data: They are not the same. As van Fraassen puts it: 
‘phenomena are actual objects, events, and processes, while [data models] are 
the products of our independent intellectual activity’ (p.259). That a scientific 
model represents data does not straightforwardly establish that it represents 
the phenomenon from which the data were gathered.  
2. Loss of Reality: Models (ultimately at least) represent phenomena. And by 
implication, models (ultimately at least) accurately or inaccurately represent 
phenomena. This does not preclude data being represented, or accurately 
represented, it just requires that phenomena are the ultimate targets of 
scientific representation.  
 
These points aren’t new. Bogen and Woodward (1988) introduced the data-
phenomena distinction, where the latter term is liberally interpreted as referring to 
objects, features of objects, events, processes, mechanisms, and so on. Their example 
of the discovery of weak neutral currents makes explicit that data (e.g. bubble 
chamber photographs or a data model extracted from them) and phenomena 
(interactions between neutrinos and bosons) should not be conflated. This is 
particularly pressing when we focus on representation simpliciter: our best theory of 
elementary particles, the so-called ‘standard model’, is about particles and their 
interactions, not bubble chamber photographs. But the concern remains when 
transposed into the context of accurate representation. If it is phenomena that are 
ultimately represented by our scientific models, then it is them that are accurately or 
inaccurately represented. Morphisms between scientific models and data can provide 
evidence for whether this is the case, but the relation of accurate representation is 
ultimately directed at phenomena.  
	   
One could argue that it is data, not phenomena, that are represented (in either sense). 
But then Loss of Reality looms. Muller, in discussing Suppes’ use of data models, 
pithily states a version of the objection as follows:   
 
‘The best one could say is that a data structure D seems to act as simulacrum 
of the concrete actual being B … But this is not good enough. We don’t want 
simulacra. We want the real thing. Come on.’ (2011, 98)  
 
Van Fraassen is acutely aware of this (he coined the phrase ‘Loss of Reality’ (p.258)). 
He states the concern as follows:  
 
‘Oh, so you say that the only ‘matching’ is between data models and 
theoretical [scientific] models. Hence the theory does not confront the 
observable phenomena, those things, events, and processes out there, but only 
certain representations [i.e. data models] of them.’ (ibid.) 
 
And he claims that: ‘[a]n empiricist account of what the sciences are all about must 
absolutely answer this objection’ (ibid). Without an answer, the structural empiricist 
is left in the uncomfortable position, whereby it is data, the ‘products of our 
independent intellectual activity’, not phenomena, that are the ultimate targets of 
scientific models.  
 
His phrasing in the quotation above suggests that he is concerned with the question of 
accurate representation rather than representation simpliciter. But this isn’t 
	  straightforward (cf. Thomson-Jones 2011). He starts the discussion with the claim that 
the fundamental question to be answered is:	  
 
‘How can an abstract entity, such as a mathematical structure, represent 
something that is not abstract, something in nature?’ (p.240) 
 
But he then shifts to the question of how a structure can do so accurately: 
 
‘The question how an abstract structure can represent something … is just 
this: how, or in what sense, can such an abstract entity as a model “save” or 
fail to “save” this concrete phenomenon’ (p.245) 
 
And then, when presenting his solution, he couches it in terms of ‘fit’, ‘match’, 
‘empirical adequacy’ and so on, and explicitly states: 
 
‘If a model were offered to represent the phenomenon, that structural relation 
[a model-phenomenon morphism] would determine whether the model was 
adequate with respect to its purpose’ (pp.249-250 emphasis added) 
 
As discussed above, regardless of whether he is concerned with accurate 
representation, or representation simpliciter, answering Loss of Reality requires an 
account of how morphisms between models and data establish that phenomena are the 
ultimate targets of scientific models. For the purposes of this paper I take van 
Fraassen’s solution, stated in terms of accurate representation, at its word. I interpret 
his argument as an attempt to establish the pragmatic equivalence between taking a 
	  scientific model to accurately represent a phenomenon and accurately represent (in 
virtue of a morphism) data extracted from it. But his argument utilizes, and at times 
equivocates between, both representational notions and, as I argue in Section 4, this 
equivocation is at least partly to blame for its eventual failure.  
 
3. Van Fraassen’s argument 
 
Van Fraassen’s strategy for dealing with Loss of Reality is to diffuse it with what he 
describes as a ‘Wittgensteinian move’ (p.254) by invoking pragmatic features in the 
contexts of using scientific models. He claims that despite the data-phenomena 
distinction, for a given scientist, in a given context, there is no difference between 
accurately representing the two. That accurately representing data is the same as 
accurately representing the system that provided it is claimed to be a ‘pragmatic 
tautology … [something that is] … logically contingent but undeniable nonetheless’ 
(p.259). Van Fraassen’s argument for this is one of the most significant contributions 
of the book, but it hasn’t received the attention it deserves. I can only speculate about 
why this is, but I suspect that it is: in part due to the considerable novelty of many of 
the central notions used; in part due to the fact that the argument is spread out 
throughout the book, interwoven with substantial broader discussions of 
representation, measurement, and empiricism; and in part due to a style of 
presentation that is often difficult to penetrate. In fact, the project of extracting a 
coherent position from the rich and intricate lines of thought is beset with exegetic 
challenges. In this section I first isolate the important notions van Fraassen invokes 
and then reconstruct his argument. This is a necessary first step in any critical 




I. Hauptsatz: ‘There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, 
made, or taken, to represent things as thus or so’ (p.23).  There are two important 
things to note about this. Firstly, it is clearly non-reductive as it invokes the intentions 
and acts of agents. Secondly, it involves representation-as, rather than representation-
of. Van Fraassen (p.16) explicitly refers to Goodman (1976) as the source of the 
distinction, and following them I assume that x is a representation-of y iff x denotes y. 
Representation-as is stronger: x represents y as thus or so iff x denotes y and attributes 
certain features to y. If y has those features then x accurately represents y with respect 
to them. To use one of van Fraassen’s examples, the proper name ‘Margaret Thatcher’ 
is a representation-of Margaret Thatcher, since it denotes her. But a caricature of 
Margaret Thatcher also represents her as thus or so, e.g. if she is depicted with horns 
and a tail then it represents her as being draconian (pp.13-15).  
 
II. Use of Representations: Hauptsatz makes clear that representations only represent 
when they are used to do so. But in addition, certain representations have particular 
uses, ‘they are typically produced for a certain use, with a certain purpose or goal’ 
(p.76). Using maps to navigate provides an illustrative example: ‘[a] map is designed 
to help one get around in the landscape it depicts’ (ibid.). Throughout this paper, I 
assume that the analogous use of models is to generate predictions about their target 
systems. This is supported by van Fraassen’s analogy between using a map to 
navigate and using the Aviation Model (AVN) for weather forecasting, i.e. to generate 
predictions about the weather (p.77).  
	   
III. Logical Space: Representations are associated with ‘logical spaces’. This is a very 
general notion. Examples include PVT space in elementary gas theory, phase spaces 
in classical mechanics, and Hilbert spaces in quantum theory (p.164). Locations in 
PVT space are combinations of pressure, volume and temperature. Routes through a 
phase space are possible trajectories of an object, and locations in a Hilbert space are 
possible quantum states of a system.  
 
IV. Self-location: A necessary condition on using a map to navigate, or a model to 
predict, is that the user self-locate in the logical space provided. They ‘must be in 
some pertinent sense able to relate him or herself, his or her current situation, to the 
representation’ (p.80). In order to navigate with a map, the user must be able to locate 
themself in the terrain depicted and associate that location with an area on the map. 
They distinguish a particular map region as representing where they are, they orient 
the map to correspond to the direction they’re facing, and so on. In doing so they 
locate themselves with respect to the map. When it comes to scientific models, van 
Fraassen claims: 
 
‘Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively represents the 
world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that this is so. Suppose we 
regard ourselves as knowing that it is so. Then still, before we can go on to use 
that model, to make predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves 
with respect to that model. So apparently we need to have something in 
addition to what science has given us here. The extra is the self-ascription of 
location.’ (p.83) 
	   
It’s worth clarifying what ‘self-location’ could mean in the spaces under 
consideration. Although suggested by van Fraassen’s cartographic analogy, I presume 
that it doesn’t require that the model user locate herself in logical space. When it 
comes to measuring the pressure of his tire (p.181), what would it mean for van 
Fraassen to locate himself in PVT space? Van Fraassen is 100psi? A more plausible, 
reading of ‘self-location’ is that the model users themselves actively locate the target 
system in logical space. And this proceeds in two steps. The model user first adopts a 
certain perspective towards the target by taking it to be the sort of thing that can be 
located in the logical space provided by the model. For example: van Fraassen takes 
the tire to be the sort of object that can be located in PVT space. But although this 
may be a necessary condition on using a model to generate a prediction, it is not the 
condition van Fraassen has in mind when he invokes the cartographic analogy. It isn’t 
enough that a navigator is located somewhere in the terrain depicted; we need to 
delineate specific point, or at least an interval or region of the space. This is the 
second step in self-location. When it comes to generating predictions using scientific 
models, this is done by inputting the target’s initial and boundary conditions: 
 
‘The AVN itself requires input to be run at all, of course: namely initial 
conditions and lateral boundary conditions obtained from operational weather 
centers in the relevant area … The model presents a space of possible states 
and their evolution over time—the input locates the weather forecaster in that 
space, at the outset of the forecasting process.’ (p.78) 
 
	  Self-location demands that it is not enough that the system is in fact thereby located, 
but the model user must perform an act of location. To speak loosely, the user 
distinguishes a region in logical space with the claim ‘that target system is there’.  	  
V. Measurement as Location in Logical Space: ‘the act of measurement is an act – 
performed in accordance with certain operational rules – of locating an item in logical 
space’ (p.165). And these measurements deliver data models. As van Fraassen notes, 
the location needn’t be a point, but can be a region (ibid.). This can, but doesn’t have 
to, be the result of measurement imprecision. Even a perfectly precise pressure 
reading p determines only a region of PVT space since there are multiple volume-
temperature pairs compatible with p.   
 
VI. Measurement as Representation: locating a system in logical space involves 
representing it as thus or so. This form of representation is not established by a 
morphism (recall van Fraassen’s worry about invoking a ‘dormative virtue’). Instead, 
data models represent because: 
 
‘A measurement is a physical interaction, set up by agents, in a way that 
allows them to gather information. The outcome of a measurement provides a 
representation of the entity (object, event, process) measured…’ (pp.179-180) 
 
A data model represents the system measured as having the features corresponding to 
the region of logical space where it is thereby located. If the system has those 
features, the data model is accurate.  
 
	  VII. Pragmatic Tautology: ‘a pragmatic tautology is a statement which is logically 
contingent, but undeniable nevertheless. Similarly, a pragmatic contradiction is a 
statement that is logically contingent, but cannot be asserted’ (p.259). Moore’s 
paradox – utterances of the form ‘P and it is not the case that I believe that P’ - is a 
classic example of the latter. They are logically contingent - their form is an agent i 
asserting ‘P & ¬Bi(P)’, where Bi(P) means  i believes that P - and neither conjunct 
semantically entails the negation of the other (if they did, i would be clairvoyant). 
Such sentences are pragmatic contradictions because, in the context of i asserting P, i 
commits herself to believing P. It is this commitment that, when combined with the 
second conjunct, makes the sentence unassertable. Since van Fraassen’s account of 
scientific representation does not involve linguistic representation, his argument 
requires generalizing from the assertablity of sentences to certain acts of 
representation.  
 
With the above notions in mind, we can now turn to van Fraassen’s argument for the 
pragmatic equivalence between taking scientific models to accurately represent data 
and phenomena. My primary interest here is not the relationship between data and 
phenomena. For my current purposes I simply grant that data represent the systems 
from which they were gathered (as per VI. Measurement as representation). I further 
grant that morphisms play a role in establishing whether a scientific model represents, 
accurately or otherwise, data. I’m concerned with representational relationships 
between scientific models and phenomena. Representation (accurate or simpliciter) is 
not a transitive relation: that a scientific model M, represents a data model D, which in 
turn represents a target system T, does not establish that the M represents T (see Frigg 
(2002, 11-12); Suárez (2003, 232-233)). And although accurately representing D 
	  might provide us with evidence that M is an accurate representation of T, this does not 
establish any representational relationship between M and T. Without this Loss of 
Reality remains.  
 
3.2 The Wittgensteinian move 
 
Van Fraassen’s resolution to Loss of Reality is to claim that in the context of use 
there’s no difference between accurately representing data and phenomena. The 
reasoning, which is found in pp.254-260, is illustrated with an example. I present it 
here before reconstructing the argument that underpins it. The example in question 
concerns only observable features of a target system (the observable-unobservable 
distinction is largely irrelevant in the current context). Focusing on observables makes 
it clear how important the Wittgensteinian move is to van Fraassen’s project. If he 
fails to establish the pragmatic equivalence with respect to observable phenomena, 
then they fail to feature in his structuralist account of scientific representation. The 
result is a far more radical anti-realist position than has been offered previously, and 
is a far more radical position than I suspect van Fraassen would accept.  
 
He begins by considering a scientist representing the growth of the deer population in 
the Princeton region. The scientific model used includes assumptions about 
environmental features: luscious gardens, the council’s culling instinct, its tendency to 
experiment with birth-control measures for the local animal population, and so on. 
The data model D is supplied by a graph constructed from cleaned up data points 
gathered by field researchers measuring samples of ‘values of various parameters over 
time’ (p.255). Van Fraassen does not specify which parameters are measured, but 
	  given that the theory concerns the deer population growth, I assume that the scientist 
literally counts deer in representative regions throughout the duration of the 
experiment. So the graph plots the number of deer against time. The target system is 
the deer population itself.  
 
The scientist has a model M about deer population growth and argues that M is 
morphic to D. Van Fraassen imagines a philosophical interlocutor, arguing that 
although M accurately represents D, the question is whether M accurately represents 
the population itself (p.254). The scientist showing the interlocutor that it matches D 
does not establish this.  
 
Van Fraassen replies that the scientist has ‘no leeway’ to deny that the model 
accurately represents the actual population without withdrawing the graph altogether 
(p.256). According to him, the scientist should say:  
 
‘Since this is my representation of the deer population growth, there is for me no 
difference between the question whether [M] fits the graph and the question 
whether [M] fits the deer population growth. If I were to opt for a denial or even a 
doubt, though without withdrawing my graph, I would in effect be offering a reply 
of form: 
 
• The deer population growth in Princeton is thus or so, but the sentence 
“The deer population growth in Princeton is thus or so” is not true, for all I 
know or believe’ (ibid). 
 
	  And since a scientist who replied this way would be faced with a Moorean paradox, 
the scientist simply cannot doubt that the model accurately represents the target 
system whilst accepting that it accurately represents the graph. This is supposed to 
establish the pragmatic equivalence between the two.  
 
That’s the example, now let’s work out why the scientist might be forced into such a 
position. In the rest of this section I reconstruct the argument for this conclusion in 
detail. I break it down into three sub-arguments, and show how the notions laid out in 
the previous subsection are utilized. It’s important to notice that the first two 
arguments – which establish that the scientist must locate the target in the logical 
space of the model in order to use it at all, and that this is done with the graph –	  are 
explicitly concerned with representation simpliciter. This accounts for the scientist’s 
claim that ‘this [data model] is my representation of the deer population growth’ 
(ibid.). The third argument then shifts to the question of accurate representation in an 
attempt to establish that, for that scientist, there is ‘no difference between the question 
whether [M] fits the graph and the question whether [M] fits the deer population 
growth’ (ibid). The first premise in the third argument makes it explicit how van 
Fraassen requires that the necessary act of representation established in the first two 
arguments must generate doxastic commitments, i.e. commit the model user to certain 
beliefs, if the third argument is to generate the pragmatic equivalence.  
 
(A) The argument for self-location: 
 
A1. A scientist S is using M to represent a target system T for certain purposes P. 
(Premise) 
	  A2. If S is using M to represent a target T for purposes P, then S must self-locate 
in the logical space, L, provided by the model.  (Premise) 
A3. S must self-locate in L. (From A2 and A3) 
	  
M is a model of deer population growth, T is the target deer population, and the 
scientist is using M to represent T for the purpose of generating a prediction (II. Use 
of Representations). M provides a logical space L, the space of possible deer 
populations and their growth through time (III. Logical Space). A necessary condition 
on using M to generate a prediction about T is self-location in L (IV. Self-location).  
 
(B) The argument from self-location to representation-as: 
 
B1. S self-locates in L using a data model D. (Premise specifying A3) 
B2. If S uses D to self-locate in L, then S uses D to represent T as thus or so (Π). 
(Premise) 
B3. S uses D to represent T as Π. (From B2 and B3) 
 
Argument (A) required that the scientist self-locate in L. In van Fraassen’s example, 
this is done using a data model D, a graph of the deer population. When S uses D to 
represent the target system, S locates T in the logical space provided by the model (V. 
Measurement as location). Locating T in a region of L requires representing T as 
having the features corresponding to that region (VI. Measurement as representation). 
Let Π be the conjunction of predicates that corresponds to that region. This may be a 
region, not a point, so these predicates are of the form ‘the magnitude of A is in region
’. In this instance A is the size of the deer population at particular times and the size Δ
	  of corresponds to the potential measurement error induced by the counting process 
and the generalization from representative samples to the population as a whole. So 
when using D to locate T in logical space the scientist represents T as Π.  
 
(C) The argument from representation-as to the pragmatic tautology: 
 
C1. The (pragmatic) content of S using D to represent T as Π includes S believing 
that T is Π. (Premise) 
C2. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to 
express disbelief in any proposition concerning T that S commits herself to in 
using D to represent T. (Premise) 
C3. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able to 
express disbelief that T is Π. (from B3, C1, and C2)  
C4. It is not the case that S is able to express disbelief that T is Π (whilst using D 
to represent T), on pain of pragmatic contradiction. (Premise) 
C5. It is not the case that S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T. 
(From C3 and C4) 
 
I return to C1 and C2 in Section 4. C3 follows from B3, C1 and C2. S represents T as 
Π  (B3), and in doing so commits herself to the belief that T is Π (C1). This 
instantiates the universal quantifier in C2 delivering C3. C4 is the instance of Moore’s 
paradox that van Fraassen is concerned with. He claims that if the scientist were to 
accept that M accurately represents D but not T, whilst using D to represent T as Π, S 
would be offering a reply of in the form of Moore’s paradox (‘the deer population is 
thus or so but…’). Taking D to represent T is analogous to asserting the first conjunct. 
Δ
	  Denying that M accurately represents T is analogous to asserting the second conjunct 
(VII. Pragmatic tautology). This generates the pragmatic equivalence between 
accurately representing T and D (C5).  
 
4. The argument scrutinized  
 
With the argument reconstructed, I now turn to my critical discussion. My objections 
are the following. Firstly, the pragmatics of representation don’t induce doxastic 
commitments: acts of representation don’t commit the agent doing the representing to 
any relevant beliefs. So C1 is false. Secondly, one option available to van Fraassen is 
to amend C1 to the claim that S takes D to accurately represent T as Π. But this isn’t 
supported by (A) and (B): it would require that in order to use a scientific model to 
generate a prediction, the model user must believe the inputted initial/boundary 
conditions. This is false. My final objection concerns C2, I argue that without an 
account of scientific representation (irrespective of accuracy), it’s difficult to get a 
grip on what it would mean for S to deny that M accurately represents T.  
 
4.1. The pragmatics of representation 
 
The argument has the following macro structure. Models are used to generate 
predictions about their targets and a necessary condition on doing this is that the user 
locate the target in the model’s logical (A). This is typically done with a data model, 
and when S uses a data model to locate a target system T in such a way, S represents T 
as Π (B). So far so good.  
 
	  C1 is vital for rest of the argument, since it is the move from S representing T as Π to 
pragmatically committing herself to the belief that T is Π that is required to generate 
the pragmatic tautology. Using the data model to represent the target system is 
supposed to commit S to the belief that the deer population is thus or so in a way 
analogous to asserting the first conjunct of the Moorean paradox. The denial that 
model accurately represents the deer population then provides the analogy with 
asserting the second.  
 
But all arguments (A) and (B) established is that S represents T as Π. And acts of 
representation do not incur the same pragmatic commitments as acts of assertion. 
Consider the example of representing Margaret Thatcher as draconian. A caricaturist 
can represent Thatcher as such without committing herself to the belief that Thatcher 
is draconian. There is a vital pragmatic difference between acts of representation and 
assertions. If the caricaturist were to assert that Margaret Thatcher was draconian, 
then she would commit herself to believing such. But the caricaturist doesn’t do this; 
she merely represents Thatcher in such a way. The artist could have been 
commissioned to draw the caricature despite having only a vague idea of who 
Thatcher was, and no knowledge about her time as Prime Minister. The artist can 
reasonably draw the caricature, thereby representing her as draconian, whilst at the 
same time remaining agnostic about her character. The same point applies to scientific 
representation: S’s act of representing the target system in a certain way doesn’t 
pragmatically commit her to the belief that the target is that way.  
 
It pays to be careful here. My claim does not concern whether or not S actually 
believes that T is Π, it is a conceptual point regarding the pragmatics of assertion and 
	  representation. Presumably in most cases, model users do believe that the 
initial/boundary conditions used are (at least approximately) accurate. But this does 
not establish that an agent’s act of representing something in a particular way 
commits that agent to any particular beliefs in the way that acts of assertion do in the 
traditional version of Moore’s paradox. So C1 is false, S’s act of representing a target 
system as thus or so doesn’t commit S to the belief that the target is thus or so. 
Therefore (C) is unsound.  
 
A possible response is to invoke a weaker doxastic attitude than belief as being 
incurred in representing a target system. And although this attitude might not deliver 
the Moorean paradox van Fraassen discusses, it may deliver a closely related 
pragmatic contradiction that still allows a version of (C) to go through. In other 
contexts van Fraassen invokes the attitude of acceptance (Muller and van Fraassen 
2008). Accepting a theory, or model, is to take it to be empirically adequate: to 
believe its observable content and to remain agnostic about its unobservable content 
(acceptance is typically applied to scientific models, but here I’m considering 
applying it to data). So, what happens if, in using D to represent T as Π, S commits 
herself to accepting that T is Π? Well that depends on T and Π. We can distinguish 
between the observable and unobservable content of Π(T), denoted Π(T)O and Π(T)U 
respectively. If S accepts Π(T), then S commits herself to believing Π(T)O and being 
agnostic about Π(T)U, i.e. not believing Π(T)U or ¬Π(T)U (see op. cit, 204).  
 
For neither of these types of content will acceptance do the work required. Regarding 
observable content we are back where we started. Accepting that Thatcher is 
draconian entails believing that she is. And an agent can represent her in such a way 
	  without taking on this commitment. Regarding unobservable content, S accepting 
Π(T)U  entails ¬BS [Π(T)U] and ¬BS [¬Π(T)U]. But this will not generate a pragmatic 
contradiction when combined with the second conjunct of van Fraassen’s instance of 
Moore’s paradox, i.e. ¬BS[Π(T)] (even restricted to its unobservable content).  
 
Invoking acceptance when an agent uses a data model to represent a target doesn’t 
work. But the above discussion suggests another available strategy available to van 
Fraassen. It proceeds in two steps. Firstly, introduce a weaker act than assertion – call 
it entertaining – and assume that an act of entertaining that P incurs a commitment to 
not believing ¬P. Again this alone doesn’t generate a pragmatic contradiction when 
combined with ¬Bi(P). But it does when combined with Bi(¬P). The second step is to 
move from a Moorean paradox of the form P & ¬Bi(P) to one of the form P & Bi(¬P) 
– i.e. from sentences like ‘it’s raining and I don’t believe it’s raining’ to ‘it’s raining 
and I believe that it’s not raining’. (C) then becomes (C’): 
 
C1'. The (pragmatic) content of S using D to represent T as Π includes S not 
believing that it is not the case that T is Π. (Premise) 
C2'. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able 
to express belief in the negation of any proposition concerning T that S 
commits herself to in using D to represent T. (Premise) 
C3'. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able 
to express belief that it is not the case that T is Π. (From B3, C1’, and C2’)  
C4'. It is not the case that S is able to express belief that it is not the case 
that T is Π (whilst using D to represent T), on pain of pragmatic contradiction. 
(Premise) 
	  C5'. It is not the case that S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but 
not T. (From C3’ and C4’) 
 
Assuming that an act of representation is an act of entertaining, in using D to 
represent T as Π, S pragmatically commits herself to not believing that it is not the 
case that T is Π , i.e. ¬BS [¬Π(T)]  (C1’). Further assume that S denying that M 
accurately represents T whilst accepting it accurately represents D, induces a 
commitment to believing that it is not the case that T is Π (C2’ and C3’). This is a 
stronger commitment than assumed in C, BS [¬Π(T)] rather than ¬BS [Π(T)]. Under 
these assumptions, if S were to take M to accurately represent D but not T, whilst at 
the same time using D to represent T, she would be offering a reply with the following 
commitments: ‘It’s not the case that I believe that T isn’t Π and I believe that T isn’t 
Π’. This would be a pragmatic contradiction.  
 
(C1’) requires that in using D to represent T as Π, S entertain that T is Π, and 
therefore commit herself to not believing that T isn’t Π. However, the following 
example shows that even this commitment is not incurred by acts of representation. 
Consider a different caricaturist representing Margaret Thatcher as draconian. This 
time assume that the Labour Party has commissioned the caricature and the artist is a 
staunch Conservative. He goes ahead and draws the picture because he desperate for 
the money. In drawing the caricature the artist represents Thatcher as a draconian, but 
he certainly doesn’t believe it. In fact, he explicitly believes that she isn’t draconian to 
the extent that he sings her praises whilst drawing the caricature. This makes him feel 
better about drawing something that goes so strongly against his political beliefs. 
Now, if, in representing Thatcher as draconian, the artist commits himself to not 
	  believing that she isn’t, then his act of drawing her as such whilst singing the negation 
would be a pragmatic contradiction. But although a strange situation, this isn’t the 
case. Acts of representing that P don’t incur the pragmatic commitment to ¬Bi(¬P). 
So C1’ is false, and (C’) unsound. 
 
4.2 From self-location to belief   
 
Despite van Fraassen’s phrasing, the above concerns suggest that argument (C) 
shouldn’t start from the premise that S uses D to represent T as Π, but rather S takes D 
to accurately represent T as Π. Rather than:  
 
‘Since [D] is my representation of the deer population growth, there is for me 
no difference between the question whether [M] fits [D] and the question 
whether [M] fits the deer population growth’ (p.256) 
 
The scientist should say: 
 
Since I take D to be an accurate representation of the deer population growth, 
there is for me … 
 
It’s plausible that in taking D to accurately represent T as Π, S commits herself to 
believing that T is Π. But since B3 only got us as far as representation, the preceding 
argument needs amending. Argument (A) stays as it is. In order to use a model to 
generate a prediction, the model user must self-locate in its logical space. (B) gets 
revised to (B*): 
	   
B1*.  S self-locates in L using a data model D. (Premise specifying A3) 
B2*.  If S uses D to self-locate in L, then S takes D to accurately represent T 
as Π. (Premise) 
B3*.  S takes D to accurately represent T as Π. (From B2*, B3*) 
 
And if this can be established then a revised version of (C) runs as follows:8 
 
C1*. The (pragmatic) content of S taking D to accurately represent T as Π 
includes S believing that T is Π. (Premise) 
C2*. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able 
to express disbelief in any proposition concerning T that S commits herself to 
in taking D to accurately represent T. (Premise) 
C3*. If S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but not T, then S is able 
to express disbelief that T is Π. (From B3*, C1*, and C2*)  
C4*. It is not the case that S is able to express disbelief that T is Π (whilst 
using D to represent T), on pain of pragmatic contradiction. (Premise) 
C5*. It is not the case that S is able to take M to accurately represent D, but 
not T. (From C3*, C4*) 
 
But although (C*) seems plausible in isolation, the argument as a whole is not, for 
B2* is false.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 (C*) is a revised version of (C), not (C’), but my criticisms can be run against a revised version of the 
latter as well. 
	  To see why, recall what self-location required. The model user had to adopt a certain 
perspective towards the target by taking it to be the sort of thing that could be located 
in the model’s logical space. She then had to delineate an area within that space for 
the target. This was a necessary condition on generating a prediction using the model. 
But neither of these steps commits the agent to any beliefs. In particular, in using a 
data model to self-locate in a model’s logical space, the model user does not thereby 
commit herself to the data’s accuracy.  
 
Consider again the example of the deer population. In order to use her model to 
generate a prediction about its size, the scientist had to input an initial number of, and 
fitness values for, the deer. The model allows the scientist to make any number of 
predictions about the future size of the population. If the scientist inputs a low fitness 
value – imagine a pro-cull council – then the model will predict a small future 
population. If the scientist initially assumes that the deer population is too large for 
the region to support, then the model will predict population decline. And so on. The 
scientist can use the model to generate numerous predictions about the deer 
population regardless of whether or not she believes these values to be accurate. All 
of these inputs serve to delineate the logical space of the model, and some input is 
necessary to generate a prediction about the target. But she is not required to believe 
them. 
 
Other examples abound. Some are of scientists failing to believe that the logical space 
of a model is correct. Ptolemaic models can be used to generate predictions about 
planetary orbits without the user believing that those planets in fact are located 
anywhere in the model’s logical space. State of the art global climate models (GCMs) 
	  contain variables that are known to describe model-processes with no direct real-
world correlates. These variables – in that context typically referred to as ‘parameters’ 
– are loosely related to sub-grid processes such as small-scale convection and cloud 
coverage. However, their values depend to a large extent on details of the particular 
computational scheme used rather than on the state of the world. So we have here a 
case where scientists don’t believe that the logical space is correct (at least not 
completely correct), and yet they pick values for certain variables in order to make 
calculations (Bradley et al.). And this is no isolated instance; one can find similar 
cases, for example, in economics (Friedman 1953) and population dynamics.9  
 
The problems don’t end here. Even supposing that the scientist believes that the 
logical space is correct, they still needn’t believe that the target is located in the 
region delineated by the model input. For example, representative concentration 
pathways (RCPs) are used to locate the global climate in the logical space of GCMs. 
They supply concentration trajectories of the main forcing agents of climate change. 
One particular pathway, RCP2.6, requires that we essentially eliminate greenhouse 
gas emissions immediately, something that no one believes is, or will be, the case. 
And yet RCP2.6 is widely used to generate numerous predictions about the global 
climate (see the IPPC report (2013), Ch.12 in particular).   
 
The point is that the scientists can use models to generate predictions about target 
systems without adopting any epistemological position towards the model, or where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for example Weisberg and Reisman (2008) who offer individual-based versions 
of the Lotka-Volterra model that start from the assumption that individuals move 
about on a 30x30 toroidal lattice.   
	  the target is located in its logical space. As stressed previously, this isn’t to say that 
scientists don’t believe that their data models and initial/boundary conditions are (at 
least approximately) accurate. My claim is that this belief is not a necessary condition 
on using a model to generate a prediction. As such it is not part of the pragmatic 
content of locating a target in logical space. And this is what van Fraassen requires. 
So, although (C*) may seem plausible in isolation, it rests on (B*) for its support, 
which in turn rests on the false premise B2*. So the argument as a whole is unsound.  
 
4.3 Representation and accurate representation 
 
I hope by now to have shown that van Fraassen’s argument fails. But there is a further 
problem that indicates more general issue. His argument concerns how scientific 
models, as set-theoretic structures, can accurately represent physical phenomena. It’s 
worth stepping back and taking stock of what could be gained by answering this 
question. If it’s an attempt to establish in virtue of what a pre-existing representational 
relationship between the model and phenomenon is accurate, then the question of 
what establishes representation simpliciter remains unanswered. We still don’t have 
an account of in virtue of what scientific models represent their targets (cf. Thomson-
Jones 2011). This is particularly worrying given that it is plausible we should answer 
this question before we investigate representational accuracy. This has been stressed 
by Suárez (2004), Contessa (2007), and Frigg (2010) who all provide accounts of 
scientific representation before commenting on the notions of representational 
accuracy that result. They all take the question of representation as conceptually prior 
to accurate representation. Moreover, nothing precludes them from accepting that 
model-data morphisms provide evidence that model-phenomena representational 
	  relationships are accurate. But if this is all van Fraassen is attempting to establish, 
then the whole machinery driving the pragmatic tautology becomes irrelevant.  
 
Van Fraassen himself starts his argument by claiming that the fundamental question 
to be answered is: 
 
‘How can an abstract entity, such as a mathematical structure, represent 
something that is not abstract, something in nature?’ (p.240) 
 
But his Wittgensteinian solution does not address this question. I suspect that van 
Fraassen would fall back on his Hauptsatz and claim that representation cannot be 
analyzed beyond this. But this does not help when we look at C2 (or its variants). In 
particular, what would it mean for S to deny that M accurately represents T? Van 
Fraassen’s phrasing suggests that in doing so S would take M to represent T, but to do 
so inaccurately. In this sense the deer scientist would be effectively asserting the 
second conjunct of van Fraassen’s version of Moore’s paradox (the sentence ‘the deer 
population is thus or so’ is not true for all I know or believe). But this needn’t be the 
question the philosophical interlocutor asks. Rather than asking whether the scientific 
model matches the phenomenon, they can ask whether the model represents it in the 
first place. This is the fundamental question after all. How can one use, make, or take 
a mathematical structure to represent something that is not abstract, something in 
nature?10 And if the scientist were to doubt that M represents T in this sense, then (C) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I’m not demanding what Suárez (2015) calls a ‘substantive account’ of scientific 
representation. The deflationary ones offered there, although they only pick out 
‘platitudes’, are enough to get a grip on the concept. And if van Fraassen’s Hauptsatz 
	  (and its variants) will again fail irrespective of my previous criticisms. I have 
established that acts representation failed to incur doxastic commitment. But what 
about representational denial, as it occurs in C2/C2’/C2*? Consider a caricature that 
depicts David Cameron as draconian. Denying that it represents Margaret Thatcher 
doesn’t incur a commitment to believing (or disbelieving) anything about Thatcher, 
other than she isn’t the one caricatured. That an agent incur any doxastic 
commitments in the denial of representational relationships is even less plausible than 




My concern in this paper is van Fraassen’s claim that for an individual scientist, in a 
given context, taking a scientific model to accurately represent data and the 
phenomenon from which the data were extracted are pragmatically equivalent. I 
showed that the argument as he states it relied on the false premise that acts of 
representation induce doxastic commitments in the way that assertions do. I 
considered an alternative formulation of the argument that would have led to the 
appropriate commitments, but argued that it turned on a false premise concerning 
necessary conditions on using models to generate predictions. My final objection 
concerned van Fraassen’s focus on accurate representation, rather than representation 
simpliciter. Without a clear account of the latter, one of his central premises, and 
indeed the dialectical structure of his argument, fails to get off the ground.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is supposed to tell us that bare representational intentions of model users suffice to 
establish scientific representation, then it falls foul of the same problems as Callender 
and Cohen (2006) (see Frigg 2010; Toon 2010).  
	   
As such the question of target-end structure remains. Unless van Fraassen is willing to 
revisit the idea that these structures are to be found ‘in the world’ this leaves him two 
options. Either give up on a structuralist account of scientific representation or adopt a 
radically anti-realist position whereby only data are represented. The latter seems 
implausible. It provides an account of science according to which models don’t 
represent, accurately or simpliciter, what they are typically taken to represent: 
physical objects, or features of objects, or events, or processes, or mechanisms. 
Instead they represent data, abstract mathematical objects that are the product of our 
independent intellectual activity. Such position is strange when the models concern 
unobservables – e.g. the model used to predict the existence of weak neutral currents 
represents bubble chamber photographs, not weak neutral currents - but the situation 
is even more troubling when the model concerns observables. To use van Fraassen’s 
example, if all that are represented are data then the replicator model represents a 
graph of Princeton’s deer population, not actual deer. Since his argument for the 
pragmatic equivalence fails, this seems to me like a reductio of the claim that data, 
rather than phenomena, are the targets of scientific models.  
 
Although the conclusions of this paper are largely negative, I hope it stimulates 
further investigation into the pragmatics of scientific representation and the role of 
data in scientific representation broadly construed. Both questions require further 
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